Original Posting February 2, 2017
Fascism comes in different forms to different societies. In 2016 it came to the Philippines in the form of Rodrigo Duterte.
Walden Bello writes “A Fascist Original”
This radical [read: rooted] friend of the Gardener developed the habit of going to the roots of any social problem most of his life now. He did it early enough this time when he wrote (gave a speech, read a paper) “A Fascist Original.” Gardeners have been discussing Walden Bello’s take on Philippine Fascism since it was shared at the Garden more than a month ago.
Listen to Walden: “Fascism comes in different forms to different societies so that people expecting fascism to develop in the ‘classic way’ fail to recognize it even when it is already upon them. In 2016, fascism came to the Philippines in the form of Rodrigo Duterte, but this event continues to elude a large part of the citizenry, some owing to fierce loyalty to the president, some out of fear of what the political and ethical consequences would be of admitting that naked force is now the ruling principle in Philippine politics.”
Walden recognizes that there is reluctance to use the term fascist, undoubtedly because the word has been applied very loosely to all kinds of movements and leaders. They’ve applied the “F” word to any who depart, in some fashion, from liberal democratic practices, and who resort instead to the use of force to achieve political objectives.
However, says Walden, there would probably be less objection among the intelligentsia to calling Duterte a Fascist “if we see as central to the definition of a fascist leader a) a charismatic individual with strong inclinations toward authoritarian rule who b) derives his or her strength from a heated multiclass mass base, c) is engaged in or supports the systematic and massive violation of basic human, civil, and political rights, and d) proposes a political project that contradicts the fundamental values and aims of liberal democracy or social democracy.”
Gardeners who accept these elements provisionally proffered by Walden as the key characteristics of a fascist leader clearly see Duterte as easily fitting the bill.
A fascist original
These same Gardeners agree with Walden that Duterte is a fascist personality and an original. “His charisma is not the demiurgic sort like Hitler’s nor does it derive so much from an emotional personal identification with the people and nation as in the case with some populists. Duterte’s charisma would probably be best described as ‘cariño brutal,’ a volatile mix of will to power, a commanding personality and gangster charm that fulfills his followers’ deep-seated yearning for a father figure who will finally end the national chaos.” Did you hear that – gangster charm, father figure and national chaos? Many Gardeners agree.
“Duterte is not a reactionary seeking to restore a mythical past. He is not a conservative dedicated to defending the status quo. His project is oriented towards an authoritarian future. He is best described, using Arno Mayer’s term, as a counterrevolutionary. [But] unlike some of his predecessors, like Hitler and Mussolini, he is not waging a counterrevolution against the left or socialism.” In Duterte’s case, the enemy or, better, the target is liberal democracy, the dominant ideology and political system of our time. This can easily be inferred from his actions and his discourse. “In this sense,” the scholarly Walden says, Duterte is “both a local expression as well as a pioneer of an ongoing global phenomenon: the rebellion against liberal democratic values and liberal democratic discourse that Francis Fukuyama had declared as the ‘end of history’ in the early 1990s.”
As a fascist original, Duterte has some new things. First, he has the dominant section of the left in his ruling coalition, something that would have been unthinkable with most previous fascist leaders, so that some Indonesian Gardeners who still remember the Sukarno era now ask, “Did Duterte bring the Left, or did the Left bring Duterte into this ruling coalition?”
Secondly and more distinctively, perhaps, is Duterte’s political methodology. Walden says: “The stylized paradigm of fascism coming to power has the fascist leader or party begin with violations of civil rights, followed by the power grab, [and] then indiscriminate repression. Duterte turns this ‘Marcosian model’ of ‘creeping fascism’ around. He begins with impunity on a massive scale, that is, the extrajudicial killing of thousands of alleged drug users and pushers, and leaves the violations of civil liberties and the grab for absolute power as mopping up operations in a political landscape devoid of significant organized opposition.” The sequence is reversed.
Scrutinizing more diligently the genesis of the Duterte fascist phenomenon, Walden hits on the “yellow explanation.”
The Stifling Hypocrisy of the EDSA Discourse
“Duterte’s ascendancy cannot be understood without taking into consideration the debacle of the EDSA liberal democratic republic that was born in the uprising of 1986. In fact, EDSA’s failure was a condition for Duterte’s success.” The oligarchic democracy that sadly followed EDSA for lack of strong people’s organizations with clear directions became a perfect prelude to this new fascism.
“What destroyed the EDSA project and paved the way for Duterte was the deadly combination of elite monopoly of the electoral system and neoliberal economic policies and the priority placed on foreign debt repayment imposed by Washington. By 2016, there was a yawning gap between the EDSA Republic’s promise of popular empowerment and wealth redistribution and the reality of massive poverty, scandalous inequality, and pervasive corruption.
“And the EDSA Republic’s discourse of democracy, human rights, and rule of law had become a suffocating straitjacket for a majority of Filipinos who simply could not relate to it owing to the overpowering reality of their powerlessness. Duterte’s discourse – a mixture of outright death threats, basag-ulero language, and frenzied railing coupled with disdainful humor directed at the elite, whom he called “coños” or cunts – was a potent formula that proved exhilarating to his audience who felt themselves liberated from the stifling hypocrisy of the EDSA discourse.”
A Third Original Point for Fascism in Power
“Probably no fascist personality since Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933 has used the mandate of a [mere] plurality at the polls to reshape the political arena more swiftly and decisively than Duterte in 2016. Even before he formally assumed office, the extrajudicial killings began; the elite opposition disintegrated, with some 98% of the so-called ‘Yellow Party,’ the Liberals, joining the Duterte Coalition; and Duterte achieved total control of both houses of Congress.”
The Supreme Court shied away from a confrontation. Another traditional bulwark of defense of human rights, the Catholic Church, exercised self-censorship, many church leaders initially afraid that in a confrontation with a popular president who threatened to expose the personal sins and human frailties of some bishops and priests it was going to be a sure loser. This is bound to change, however, sooner than later. The Philippine church is an institution now accustomed to historic confrontations and the offering of confessors and martyrs. Watch out for this change in the month of February. The national bishops’ confab happens twice yearly – in January (hence watch for February) and July.
Walden moves on: “A novice in foreign policy, Duterte was able to combine personal resentment with acute political instinct to radically reshape the Philippines’ relationship with the big powers, notably the United States. What surprised many though was that there was very little protest in the Philippines at Duterte’s geopolitical reorientation given the stereotype of Filipinos being ‘little brown brothers.’ What protest there was came mainly from traditional anti-American quarters which evinced skepticism about the President’s avowed intentions.”
Here, one must give it to Duterte who quite understood that “coexisting with admiration for the US and US institutions exhibited by ordinary Filipinos is a strong undercurrent of resentment at the colonial subjugation of the country by the US, the unequal treaties that Washington has foisted on the country, and the overwhelming impact of the ‘American way of life’ on local culture. One need not delve into the complex psychology of Hegel’s master-servant dialectic to understand that the undercurrent of the US-Philippine relationship has been the ‘struggle for recognition’ of the dominated party. Duterte has been able to tap into this emotional underside of Filipinos in a way that the left has never been able to with its anti-imperialist program,” brilliantly noted Walden Bello, erstwhile spokesman of the Philippine Left.
Duterte could really splice nationalism and authoritarianism in a very effective fashion, though many progressives have seen this as mainly motivated by opportunism. No matter. It’s a fact.
Are there no chinks in the Duterte armor? Yes, indeed, and one of them is the health and age issue. Not his foes or critics falsely accusing him but Duterte himself has been candid about his medical problems and his dependence on the drug fentanyl, reportedly a strongly addictive substance that is 50 to 100 times stronger than morphine and has the same effects as heroin. To repeat, the source of all these news is none other than Duterte himself. “The age factor is not unimportant, considering that the he is now 72. Hitler became chancellor at 44 and Mussolini became prime minister at 39. For the successful pursuit of an ambitious political project, one’s energy level is not unimportant.”
“More problematic,” said Walden, “is the issue of institutionalizing the movement.” The force that drove Duterte’s electoral insurgency has not yet been converted into a mass movement. Duterte’s core group knows this. They saw that the reason Joseph Estrada was ousted in 2001 was because he was not able to fall back on an organized mass movement to protect him. Secretary Leoncio “Jun” Evasco, is the key person the President is relying on to fill the breach by forming the Kilusang Pagbabago (Movement for Reform) that was launched in August 2016.
Evasco envisions a mass organization along the lines of the Communist mass movement, the National Democratic Front, where he became politicized even when he was still a Catholic priest. He knows he has to contend with competing projects from Duterte’s other political allies, like the Pimentels, the Marcoses, and the Arroyos, who would prefer an old-style political formation bringing together elite personalities. But Evasco knows only too well a political formation along t”trapo” lines would be the kiss of death for Duterte’s electoral insurgency.
He would rather deliver on political and social reforms. But since practically all of the key political and economic elites have declared allegiance to Duterte, Evasco will find it difficult to see how he can deliver on his political and economic reform agenda without alienating key supporters.
“The Marcoses, who still have their ill-gotten wealth stashed abroad, the Arroyos, who have been implicated in so many shady deals, and so many other elites, many of whom have cases pending before the Ombudsman, are not likely to be disciplined for corruption, especially given their very close links to Duterte. Nor will the Visayan Bloc, that has come in full force behind Duterte, agree to a law that will extend the very incomplete agrarian reform program. Nor will the big monopolists like Manuel Pangilinan and Ramon Ang, who have pledged fealty to him, submit without resistance to being divested of their corporate holdings,” Walden intones.
“This is not to say that Duterte is a puppet of the elites. Having a power base of his own that he can easily turn on friend or foe, he is beholden to no one. Indeed, one can argue that most of the elite have joined him mainly for their own protection, like small merchants paying protection money to the mafia. The issue, rather, is how serious he is about social reform and how willing he is to alienate his supporters among the elite,” Walden continued.
“The same goes for economic reform. Ending contractualization (or ENDO, for ‘End of Contract’), one of the President’s most prominent promises, is currently bogged down in efforts to arrive at a ‘win-win’ solution for management and labor, and all the major labor federations are fast losing hope the administration will deliver on this.
“As for macroeconomic policy, any departure from neoliberal principles on the part of orthodox technocrats like Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno and National Economic and Development Authority Director General Ernesto Pernia is far-fetched. Again, the question lies in how convinced Duterte is that neoliberalism is a dead end and how willing he is to incur the technocratic and bureaucratic displeasure and loss of confidence on the part of foreign investors that would be elicited by adopting a different economic paradigm.
“Social and economic reform is Duterte’s Achilles heel, and the President himself is aware that popularity is a commodity that can disappear quickly in the absence of meaningful reforms. Dissatisfaction is fertile ground for the build-up of opposition. This spells danger for the country in the medium term.
“Even if he is able to quickly create a mass-based party, Duterte, to stay securely in power, would find that he would need to resort to the repressive apparatuses of the state to quell discontent and opposition. This may not be too difficult a course to follow. As noted earlier, having led a bloody campaign that has already claimed over 6,000 lives [almost 7000], the suspension of civil liberties and the imposition of permanent emergency rule would be in the nature of ‘mopping up’ operations for Duterte. It would be a walk in the park,” said Walden. But not really – the Armed Forces of the Philippines have not shown in the least bit any propensity to be his puppet or under his absolute control, unlike the Philippine National Police which has succeeded in showing off its criminal, rogue, scalawag character – and, therefore, again not easily controlled by the President. Evasco will have to think seriously now of a new “Fifth Branch” with an old name like the “Philippine constabulary” peopled by communist and bandit-type partisans. No, this project will not be easy to carry out.
The opposition
Walden asks: “Does the opposition matter? The elite opposition is extremely weak at this point, with most of the Liberal Party having joined the Duterte bandwagon out of opportunism or fear. An opposition led by Vice President Leni Robredo, who resigned from Duterte’s cabinet after being told not to attend meetings, is not likely to be viable…. Robredo has shown poor judgment, receptiveness to bad advice, and little demonstrated capacity for national leadership, and is, in the view even of some of her supporters, largely a political creation of Liberal Party operatives who wanted to convert the name of her deceased husband, former Department of the Interior and Local Government head Jesse Robredo, into political capital.
“Moreover, her continuing strong ties to the double-faced Liberal Party and the former administration lend her to becoming easily discredited among both Duterte supporters and opponents.”
The Left in crisis
What about the Left?
Walden correctly put it: “Duterte’s coming to power created a crisis for the Left. For one sector of the Left, Akbayan, the social democratic Left that had allied itself uncritically with the Aquino administration, Duterte’s ascendancy meant their marginalization from power along with the Liberal Party, for which they had, with their leadership’s eyes wide open, become the grassroots organizing arm.
“For the traditional, or what some called the ‘extreme left,’ Duterte posed a problem of another kind. While the National Democratic Front and Communist Party had not supported Duterte’s candidacy, they accepted Duterte’s offer of 3 cabinet or Cabinet-level positions, as secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Social Welfare and Development and chair of the National Anti-Poverty Commission. They also accepted the president’s offer to initiate negotiations to arrive at a final peace agreement.
“For Duterte, the entry of personalities associated with the Communist Party into his Cabinet provided a left gloss to his regime, a proof that he was progressive, ‘a socialist, but only up to my armpits,’ as he put it colorfully during his victory speech in Davao City on June 4, 2016.”
In dealing with the Left, did not Duterte clearly have the better part of the bargain? Or was he not really just dealing with himself? The regime’s central policy of killing drug users and pushers without due process escalated, no new land reform law was passed that would allow agrarian reform to continue, there was little movement in the administration’s promise to end contractualization, and macroeconomic policy continued along neo-liberal lines. What gains could the Left boast of?
But they found it hard to shelve the peace negotiations, from which they had already made some gains, and to part from heading up government agencies that gave them unparalleled governmental resources to expand their mass base.
The Left had fast become “organic” to Duterte. The Left, Duterte knew, would find it extremely difficult to part from the positions of power it had gained. It had already paid the price of association with a bloodthirsty regime.
Whether he is fully conscious of it or not, Duterte’s ascendancy has severely shaken all significant political institutions and political players in the country, from right to left. Inaccurately he thinks “civil society” is where hope lies. But “like the anti-Marcos resistance 4 decades back,” said Walden, “the only certainty members of the anti-fascist front [civil society] can count on is that they’re doing the right thing. And that, for some, is a certainty worth dying for.
The truth, however, is that only two institutions remain who have traditionally been crucial power players: the AFP and the CBCP. One wonders who is really looking at them closely. Duterte has clearly failed in charming the AFP to his side during many visits to their camps. And he declared war on the CBCP even when the latter was not looking for a fight. Walden glosses over the history and continuing potential of these two institutions that caused regime changes in 1986 and 2001. They cannot be ignored. FINIS
Walden Bello made the only recorded resignation out of principle in the history of the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines in 2015 owing to what he saw as the Aquino administration’s double standards in dealing with corruption, failure to deliver economic and social reform, and subservience to the United States. An anti-dictatorship activist, he was principal author of “Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines,” which exposed the Marcos-World Bank alliance in forging the export-oriented capitalist development model. A retired professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines, he is currently senior research fellow at Kyoto University and professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton.